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I. INTRODUCTION
In oral argument in Baker v. Carr, Attorney Z.T. Osborn, Jr., on behalf
of Tennessee voters arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should hold
legislative apportionment ajusticiable issue, exclaimed that "the motto of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee is Fiatjusticia ruat caelum; Let justice
be done if the skies should fall." With that exhortation, Osborn remarked
to the Court, "We have no other place to go. We are at the capital of the
world."'
* Editor's Note: With this Essay by Professor Stephen A. Higginson of Loyola University
College of Law, the Florida Law Review presents the first multimedia article in our sixty-year
history. We invite you not only to read Professor Higginson's piece about oral advocacy before the
United States Supreme Court, but also to listen to the moments of Supreme Court advocacy that
Professor Higginson writes about in his Article. Supreme Court audio recordings of litigant
arguments began in 1955, and today are available from The Oyez Project, at http://www.oyez.org.
In this Article, each oral advocacy moment may be heard by clicking into the footnote containing
the oral argument after the signal hear. If you are reading this Article in print form, you may listen
to links to the audio clips from our website at http://www.floridalawreview.org/higgin/mp3list.htm.
We are grateful for permission for this shared usage given by Professor Jerry Goldman, director of
the Oyez Project.
** Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University College of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana.
I am grateful to Etheldra Scoggin, of the Loyola University New Orleans Law Library, and my
research assistant Chun Kuo for their assistance retrieving Supreme Court oral arguments.
1. Transcript of Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, at 76-77, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (No. 6), reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONALLAW 692 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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This Article seeks to show that scholars, especially constitutional
scholars, must pay more attention to the ways advocates frame their
controversies at the "capital of the world." If the Anti-federalists'
prophecy was that an overly complex constitution would accrete power
around its ambiguities, then the perpetual refinement of the Constitution
by lawyers in controversy-from article to section to sentence to clause to
phrase to word- has given the best protection against inflexibility.' This
thesis is timely because lawyering is more accessible with the Court's
recent decision to post oral arguments "on the same day an argument is
heard by the Court."3 The topic is pragmatic because scholarly attention
to judges' courtroom conversations with lawyers may help close the divide
between the academy and the legal profession.
Moreover, understanding persuasive advocacy is vital to understanding
constitutional law. Walking into the Court on December 6, 1965, and
listening to the controversy preceding the Court's decision in Brown v.
Louisiana' foretells the Court's eventual ruling by displaying the collapse
of this "separate but equal" argument by Louisiana attorney Richard
Kilboume:
JUSTICE FORTAS: The question occurs to me, is the State
of Louisiana telling us that in this Parish library facilities are
not segregated, that is to say, that a Negro can get service
from any library facility, any public library facility in this
Parish?
RICHARD KILBOURNE: Yes sir, I would say that they can.
Although the Court accepted Osborn's argument that legislative apportionment was justiciable,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), this advocacy connects significantly also to Justice Frankfurter,
in dissent, who caustically replied that "[w]e were soothingly told at the bar of this Court ... a
euphoric hope ... to enthrone the judiciary... [whereas] [i]n this situation, as in others of like
nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant
electorate ... [and] an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's
representatives." Id. at 269-270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. This Article does not develop its most obvious proof when the Court explicitly ties its
reasoning to concessions and points made in arguments submitted to it. Cf. MARK R. KILENBECK,
M'CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING ANATION 5, 95-109 (Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull
eds., 2006) (detailing indebtedness to nine days of oral arguments propounded by counsel just three
days before the Court issued its ruling). Those cross-reference imperatives to what lawyers have
done are unavoidable, but because they endorse or chide out of the decisions themselves they
permit the focus on end-product that most doctrinal scholarship (case comments and casebooks)
perpetuates.
3. Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Transcripts,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts.html (last visited May 4,
2008). Supreme Court Rule 28 instructs litigants that reasons they give during oral argument
"should emphasize and clarify the written arguments in the briefs." Sup. CT. R. 28(1).
4. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
[Vol. 60
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QUESTION: Is that the representation of the State of
Louisiana?
ANSWER: That's the representation of the State of Louisiana
which I make and which I certainly stand by-
QUESTION: Now these cards, these library cards, as I
remember the record, there is testimony to the effect that a
library card issued to a Negro is stamped Negro. Any dispute
about that?
ANSWER: No sir. There is no dispute about that.
QUESTION: Does that practice continue?
ANSWER: I really, I just couldn't answer that-
QUESTION: Well, there is a blue bookmobile for the
Negroes and a red one for the whites, isn't there? How can
you say it's not segregated?
ANSWER: Well, I say it's not segregated because if a white
person wants to use that blue bookmobile, they would let him
use it; if a colored person want to use a red bookmobile-I
may have my colors wrong, but I believe that's right-they
would certainly wouldn't be able to refuse him service.
QUESTION: The record says quite the contrary, doesn't it?
Is there any testimony in the record to support what you have
just said?
ANSWER: I believe it is. Now you see, this, something like.
this has never come up, actually, before. I mean-
QUESTION: Well, it sure is up now.
ANSWER: Sir?
QUESTION: I said, it's up now, and I want to ask you about
the last statement you made. Is there anything in the record to
the effect that a Negro who wants to get a book from the red
bookmobile, can do so? There is testimony from some
woman who used to work for the library-I've forgotten her
name-to the precise opposite .... [S]he said, "The only
person who used the blue bookmobile is Negroes and the blue
bookmobile services three parishes for all Negroes, and
occasionally if a white person would come to the blue
HeinOnline  -- 60 Fla. L. Rev. 859 2008
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bookmobile, I'd give him a schedule telling him when the red
bookmobile would come."
ANSWER: I believe that would be the only testimony that's
in the record.
QUESTION: That looks like a segregated library system.
ANSWER: Well, I often get confused when you say
segregated system or integrated system because in Clinton,
Louisiana, well, I've always felt like we had more integration
than probably any place in the United States, I mean, just
from the way people live. But I don't-segregation and
integration seems to mean different things in different parts
of the country.
QUESTION: Prior to this incident, had Negroes ever gone
into that library?
ANSWER: You mean to get a book? They often went in
there-
QUESTION: Gone in there for a service to the library as a
white person would?
ANSWER: I don't believe they had. No, sir.
QUESTION: Would you explain to us why that would be if
you didn't have segregation?
ANSWER: No, I, I really can't, I can't explain why that could
be, except, as I say, no doubt it was a custom that they did not
go in that library at that time.'
Trying to reconcile blue bookmobiles for blacks with the demands of
the Constitution, Attorney Kilbourne first contends that segregation and
integration are indistinct terms; then his constitutional grip slips down
from avoidance to evasion; then down further to slanted truth; finally, he
retreats into semantics, asserting that blacks have a "custom" of not using
libraries.6 Only with this vivid collapse in mind are we unsurprised that the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Fortas, not only held Petitioner Brown's
library breach-of-peace conviction invalid, but also elaborated as follows:
5. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 6, 1965, at clip 1, Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966) (No. 41), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm,
6. Hear id.
[Vol. 60
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We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional
right-the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly, and
freedom to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances....
It is an unhappy circumstance that the locus of these
events was a public library-a place dedicated to quiet, to
knowledge, and to beauty. It is a sad commentary that this
hallowed place in the Parish of East Feliciana bore the ugly
stamp of racism. It is sad, too, that it was a public library
which, reasonably enough in the circumstances, was the stage
for a confrontation between those discriminated against and
the representatives of the offending parishes.7
First, this Article uses advocacy moments like this-rarely
incorporated into casebooks on constitutional law-to demonstrate how
advocacy foretells much of constitutional decision-making. Second, by
referring to several dozen leading constitutional decisions and focusing on
how lawyers in dialogue with Justices shaped decisions, this Article
explains how three features of advocacy often determine a case's outcome.
Finally, this Article shows that scholarship must realign constitutional
doctrine with persuasive or unpersuasive lawyering, both to tie in the
lawyer's professional role and, more importantly, to better recognize the
Court's opinions as a group-assembled product begun when the Justices
speak with attorneys.8
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AS THE OUTCOME OF PERSUASIVE
LAWYERING
Great and small cases that stand in decisional edifice-as well as
buttressed by scholarly scaffolding-are heard aloud and at inception by
the Court as controversies compressed in courtroom clashes over
constitutional syntax, origin and purpose. Consider the Commerce Clause.
Although leading casebooks contain excerpts from Heart ofAtlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States,9 none includes this argument by Attorney Moreton
Rolleston, who sought to invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
7. Brown, 383 U.S. at 141-42.
8. See Transcript of Oral Argument on May 13, 1952, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 592 (1952) (Nos. 744, 745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 976-77 ("This is something that cannot be decided, it is not a case
that can be decided, in one day. After your discussions here come the arguments; as a matter of fact,
the arguments have just then begun.").
9. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
2008]
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I didn't come here to talk about commerce. I didn't come here
to argue the question of whether or not this Motel has an
effect on commerce, certainly everything that happens in this
country has an effect on commerce. But I did perceive, I
hope, that in the writings of members of this Court there is
still the great facet of personal liberty that this Court stands
for. This Court under the Constitution is the last bulwark of
personal liberty. Where else can a man go to defend personal
liberty? So if you get to your questions that you asked, the
answer is that commerce has got to stop somewhere with
commerce, in the sense that a business function is commerce.
And that the power of the Commerce Clause under the
Constitution does not go to people. If you don't accept that
fundamental, I'm lost.
Attorney Rolleston did lose. In fact, his declamation that people are not as
protected as commerce also flowed directly into Justice Douglas'
concurrence, which reiterated that people discriminated against because of
race should occupy "'a more protected position in our constitutional
system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state
lines. ,""'
Alternatively, consider our Constitution's impeachment machinery.
The Court's landmark holding in Nixon v. United States2 announced that
the method the Senate chooses to "try" impeachment cases lies in large
part in its "sole" discretion, and thus may include delegation by the full
Senate to a Senate committee. 3 Not one casebook on constitutional law,
however, refers to the following compressed exchange during oral
argument on October 14, 1992, between Justice White and Solicitor
General Kenneth Starr about syntactical emphasis, etymological pedigree,
and the Court's own practice of delegating authority to special masters:
KENNETH STARR: I think the word "try" meant something
different to the Framers. We've cited-
10. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 5, 1964, at clip 2, Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379
U.S. 241 (No. 2), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm. This argument excerpt
has intonations of bigotry, yet asserts, as its point of law, the states' rights viewpoint that prevailed
in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 615-18 (2000), but failed in the bracketing cases of Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-29
(1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-18, 29 (2005).
11. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)).
12. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
13. Id. at 226, 237-38 (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments.")).
[Vol. 60
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JUSTICE WHITE: Well, whatever it meant, they have to be
able to-they have to fit it within the word "try."
ANSWER: They have to fit it within the word "try." Now,
what did the Framers mean by try, and we have given to the
Court the 1755 Samuel Johnson dictionary-to examine or to
examine as a judge-and just as this Court examines as a
judge in original cases by having a special master do, by the
way, considerably more ......
The Court's unanimous decision issued on January 13, 1993, includes both
the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's holding citing to Samuel Johnson's
dictionary 5 and Justice White's concurrence noting the practice of courts
to delegate to special masters.' 6
Relating to executive power, examine the final moments of argument
framing the Court's landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer.'7 Amicus counsel Harold Heiss, representing the railroad labor
unions, had this extra-legal retort to whether America's hostilities in Korea
warranted seizure of domestic steel production facilities: "Whatever there
may be in Korea, I can say this: My boy is there and my boy told me that
he is far more interested in the preservation of the fundamental freedom
of this country than he is in anything in Korea."'"
Or, consider United States v. Nixon'--popularly referred to in the
casebooks as the Court's constitutional stop on executive power. But to
perceive the immensity of that stop, every student of this terse, qualified,
executive privilege holding must go back to Attorney St. Clair's sweeping
originalist and political-process argument that turning "Richard Nixon
[into], let's say, an eighty-five percent president, not a hundred percent
president... can't be constitutional[. ' 2 °
Shifting to equal-protection doctrine, it is during attorney argument that
we hear the Court famously stiffen in 1985 against peremptory strikes
based on race.2' Similarly, almost ten years later, it is in dialogue with
14. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 14, 1992, at clip 3, Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (No.
91-740), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
15. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-30.
16. Id. at 250 (White, J., concurring).
17. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
18. Transcript of Oral Argument on May 13, 1952, Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (Nos. 744,
745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 994.
19. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on July 8, 1974, at clip 4, Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
21. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 12, 1985, at clip 5, Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (pressing
an attorney into defending even open and acknowledged uses of race in peremptory strikes).
HeinOnline  -- 60 Fla. L. Rev. 863 2008
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attorneys that the invalidity of strikes based on gender becomes
self-evident.22
The same value in hearing the Supreme Court's disbelief is explosively
proven in landmark controversy after landmark controversy. Listen in on
April 21, 1969, to understand why the Court would later rule that Congress
may not exclude elected members as it deems appropriate; 23 or on March
31, 1976, to consider with the Court whether the death penalty is excessive
in severity, but "not in a constitutional sense"; 24 or on April 3, 1962, to
hear school prayer positioned into a constitutional formula;25 or on March
31, 1976, to hear why there is a First Amendment imperative protecting
flag burners.26
22. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 2, 1993, at clip 6, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (No. 92-1239), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(This exchange occurs: Q: "But you're arguing that there's nothing wrong with a counsel that's
continuing to exclude them solely on the basis of their gender." A: "I'm not saying that that's right,
or wrong. I'm saying--" Q: "No, yes you are, you're saying it's perfectly constitutional." A: "I'm
saying, well, that's what I mean." And minutes thereafter, counsel is asked and answers as follows:
Q: "[I]sn't it true that there is no other group in the history of this country that was excluded from
jury service as long as women, not even racial classifications .... A: "Justice Ginsburg, it is true
that only blacks and women have been under the law denied the right and that actually black men
were allowed to sit on juries prior to women in Alabama.").
23. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 21, 1969, at clip 7, Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969) (No. 138), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Q: "I take
it an exclusion solely on the grounds of race would not be within the [reversible] category of utter
perversion, as you see it?" A: "In my opinion it would not, Sir, although clearly unconstitutional,
clearly improper." Q: "Well, what could be more perverse than that?").
24. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31, 1976, at clip 8, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (No. 75-5394), vacated, 429 U.S. 875 (1976), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm ("Of course it's excessive in its severity. But not in a constitutional sense. And that's
where we differ. I'll take the back seat to no one in revering human life.").
25. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 3, 1962, at clip 9, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (No. 468), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("I want to make
it absolutely clear, before this Court, that I come here not as antagonist to religion, that my clients
are deeply religious people, that we come here in the firm belief that the best safety of religion in
the United States ... is to keep religion out of our public life .... I don't take issue with the
goodness or the badness of this prayer. I say prayer is good. My clients say prayer is good. But what
we say here is that this is the beginning of the end of religious freedom when religious activity such
as this is incorporated in the public school system of the United States.").
26. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31, 1976, at clip 10, Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (No. 88-155), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Q:
"Why... did the defendant's actions here destroy the symbol? His actions would have been useless
unless the flag was a very good symbol for what he intended to show contempt for? His action does
not make it any less a symbol." A: "Your Honor, we believe that if a symbol, over a period of time,
is ignored or abused, that it can in fact lose its symbolic effect." Q: "I think not at all. I
think... when somebody does that to the flag, the flag becomes even more a symbol of the
country.").
[Vol. 60
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Beyond elucidating why the Court draws constitutional rules as it does,
advocacy also has value because it reveals the messiness of legal work
around human controversy.27 One case is tinctured with untimeliness;28
another, inconstancy of position;29 many, lack of standing.3 ° These
concepts are dry, yet whole sets of litigation rules are built on them, and
many outcomes end with them. Lawyering these boundaries into courts is
indispensable terrain advocates must cover. Today, students study these
issues in casebooks largely as announced "political question" doctrine set
forth in Baker v. Carr,3 Powell v. McCormack,32 and Elk Grove Unified
SchoolDistrict v. Newdow.33 But each of these case and controversy clause
decisions gains clearest exposition by going to the lawyers who were at the
Court's door.34
27. The first few minutes ofAttomey St. Clair's argument on behalfofPresident Nixon begin
with his grave indication that the Court must resist entry into a political dispute. But then the mood
slips abruptly into confusion and laughter about what relief would fit his request-dismissal,
vacatur, or another disposition. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on July 8, 1974, at clip 11,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm.
28. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 26,2001, at clip 12, Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606(2001) (No. 99-2047), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(addressing whether a property owner who acquired title to the property after it was subject to
wetlands regulations may still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment).
29. Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 18, 1984, at clip 13, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984) (No. 82-1213) http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (questioning
whether other issues were raised in the lower courts).
30. A casebook favorite on the standing doctrine illustrates the imperative of studying what
lawyers throw into the constitutional mix. In City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the
Court held that Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds did not meet threshold
requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution. E.g., JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONALLAW 1558-59 (10th ed. 2006). Students are told that the Court dismissed the case
because Lyons's fear of twice being choked by police was speculative and remote, thus only a
threatened injury. Id. Listening to Attorney Michael Mitchell, counsel for Lyons, one first hears a
disagreeing position, hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 2, 1982, at clips 14, 15,
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (No. 81-1064), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm, but,
startlingly even for the Justices, mid-argument, Mitchell announces that Lyons no longer feels
himself injured at all, and would himself ask that the Court dismiss the matter. Id. at clips 16-18.
31. 369 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1962).
32. 395 U.S. 486, 495 (1969).
33. 542 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2004).
34. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, at clip 19, Baker, 369 U.S.
186 (No. 6), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("We fully recognize that
there are wrongs which can be righted only by the people or by the legislature. This Court doesn't
carry the whole burden of government .... But I suggest to you that judicial inaction, through
excessive caution, or through a fancied impotence, in the face of crying necessity and very serious
wrongs, may also do damage to our constitutional system.... I suggest that this is the occasion for
such a blow."); Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 24, 2004, at clips 20-21, Newdow, 542 U.S.
1 (No. 02-1624), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (after questions about
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Listening to lawyers argue to the Court helps predict future outcomes,
as well as reconcile past decisions. Vexing issues of how constitutionalism
will work in the future become clearer if one hears Justices discuss these
issues aloud in the crucible of an actual case. For example, the current
debate over whether international views are considered in constitutional
discourse helps answer itself when one overhears that conversation.35
These and other constitutional decisions can be fully understood only after
listening to the arguments of persuasive and unpersuasive lawyers.
III. A SHIFT IN ANALYSIS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
To shift the analysis to how law is made, scholarship must change its
focus, from the announced decision, to the one question that brings
advocacy, decision-making, and doctrine into the comprehensible
sequence lawyers live: Which lawyer put the Court where it came out, and
how?
The Supreme Court answers this question, giving the necessary clarity
to constitutional law. Scholars should examine the advocacy material
submitted in connection with each case.36 In particular, scholars must read
the Court's own "in the year of our Lord," phraseology, and points of deistic generality-to which
counsel responds, "I don't think that I can include "under God," to mean 'no God,' which is exactly
what I think"-the interruptive threshold standing clarification comes abruptly, "Ijust want to point
out that, once again, you're arguing based on the child and I think there is a serious standing
problem."); Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 21, 1969, at clip 22, Powell, 395 U.S. 486 (No.
138), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("Now I submit that there are at least
five separate reasons why his demands for relief cannot be granted ....").
35. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 17, 1972, at clip 23, Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Nos. 69-5003, 69-5030, 69-5031), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm (questioning about foreign processes ending the death penalty preceding the
Court's momentous Eighth Amendment halt in Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40); Recording of Oral
Argument on May 14, 1990, at clip 24, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (Nos. 89-
1433, 89-1434), (questioning foreign views on flag burning in oral argument over whether the Flag
Protection Act violated freedom of expression under First Amendment); Recording of Oral
Argument on Oct. 13, 2004, at clips 25-27, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (questioning the relevance of international
law and opinion in deciding domestic legal and death penalty issues).
36. For example, if scholars read the items that correspond to subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(h)
of Supreme Court Rule 24 (the "question presented" and each side's "summary of the argument,"
i.e. their "clear and concise condensation of the argument made in the body of the brief'), an instant
result is comparison of each litigant's framing of the "question presented" as it evolves from briefs
into oral argument, and then emerges in final characterization answered by the Court in its decision.
Sup. CT. R. 24(a); Sup. CT. R. 24(h). This carving by judges and litigants over the question
presented, though chambered from public assessment during the opinion-writing stage, is also
instructive when controversies are heard. Thus, framing the Eighth Amendment decision in
Furman, striking down capital punishment, Professor Amsterdam contours the question of death
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(or listen to) how attorneys "emphasize and clarify the written arguments
in the briefs" during oral argument, when their propositions are being
tested by the Court.37 In turn, this shift in focus to advocacy illuminates
three points no lawyer can overlook (elaborated below, in corresponding
sections of this Article):
(1) whether positive facts are forcefully presented and
negative ones effectively dealt with;
(2) whether pertinent points of law are forcefully presented;
and
(3) whether policy concerns are forcefully presented.
When robust scholarship considers the materials that the Supreme Court
itself deems necessary to render its decision, inquiry will shift from the
casebook holding to the adversarial making of that holding and to whether
and how the Court's holding drew on specific argument submitted by
lawyers.
A. Constitutional Controversy Highlights Facts
Attention to advocacy restores case facts to a place of importance,
especially in constitutional litigation and even at the Supreme Court level.
The consolidated cases that revived the death penalty in 1976, for
example, were won by attorney arguments that drew out the inexorable
sadness of victimhood 8 Indeed, refocusing on the controversies as they
on behalf of Furman. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 17, 1972, at clip 28, Furman,
408 U.S. 238 (Nos. 69-5003,69-5030,69-5031), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (questioning Professor Amsterdam regarding whether the imposition of the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Discussing the
opposite (beginning) end during the framing of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the same
contouring occurs regarding birth. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 13, 1971, at clip 29,
Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (requesting
a framework from which to decide whether the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy).
37. See SuP. CT. R. 28(1).
38. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31, 1976, at clip 30, Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 74-6257), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(expounding upon the gruesome details of the crime in a case deciding whether punishment of
death violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31,
1976, at clip 31, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (No. 75-5394), vacated, 429 U.S. 875 (1976),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (describing the rape and murder of a child
by dumping her in a river without any remorse); Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30, 1976,
at clip 32, Proffittv. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (No. 75-5706), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginsonmp3list.htm (describing a medley of heinous cases in Florida).
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play out in the Supreme Court accentuates the human work of the
judiciary. The heartstrings of controversies have shaped our Constitution.
We are forgetful, and we mislead when we dissociate judicial outcomes
from the people who clashed over them and from the judges who
considered that clash. If you listen to the Supreme Court in the winter of
1989, you will hear the first question asked to help resolve whether the
Due Process Clause would permit Nancy Cruzan's parents to refuse life-
sustaining treatment on their daughter's behalf in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.39 This narrative of harm has resulted in
our constitutional betterment, and its proof is moving.
Similarly, through facts, attorneys can give anger its time and place.
More than five minutes of vitriol against unregulated domestic espionage
wiretapping successfully framed the Court's decision in United States v.
United States District Court.4" Attorney Arthur Kinoy's constitutional
anger is timely today, yet untaught.
The outcome of the landmark decision in Griswold v. Connecticut4
seems ineluctable when we hear that Connecticut's Joseph Clark could
give no reason why Connecticut should ban contraceptives to married
couples.42 Recently, the Supreme Court's non-decision in the "under God"
Pledge of Allegiance case43 may be comprehensibly reduced to one factual
rejoinder heard during argument, when Justice Ginsburg interrupted pro
se litigant Newdow to remind him that his ex-wife possessed the custodial
position that trumped any assertion of injury to him.' Another famous
constitutional case, Clinton v. Jones,45 which rejected President Clinton's
claim of temporal immunity from civil litigation relating to acts that
39. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 6, 1989, at clip 33, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (No. 88-1503), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm ("Have you ever seen a patient in a persistent vegetative state?").
40. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding that CIA domestic wiretapping without a search warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment); hear Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 24, 1972, at clip 34,
US. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (No. 70-153), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (Attorney Arthur Kinoy's heated arguments against the ominous power of the executive).
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Constitution protects marital privacy against state
restrictions on the use of contraceptives).
42. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 29, 1965, at clip 35, Griswold, 381 U.S. 479
(No. 496),http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Justice insists repeatedly that
Connecticut articulate a coherent "purpose" behind its statutory ban on contraceptives, whereupon,
eventually, counsel concedes that Connecticut's "population argument" is one he "personally [is]
not too happy with" and that the "only argument we can honestly say is that this is a question of
pure power").
43. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
44. Hear Recording ofOral Argument on Mar. 24,2004, at clip 36, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No.
02-1624), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
45. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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occurred before his presidential term,' may have been propelled by the
factual concession that apparently no governor had the shield from
lawsuits Clinton asked the Court to give him.47
An overarching, but casebook-quiet lesson from fact advocacy is not
simply that judges are intolerant of inaccuracy,48 but that they make rulings
after assessing that inaccuracy. Advocacy material demonstrates that when
a lawyer trips on an overstatement of fact or law, he loses persuasiveness.
Consider Louisiana's argument framing the Court's decision in Duncan v.
Louisiana.49  Louisiana Assistant Attorney General Wolbrette's
presentation, which culminated in dismissive and nervous laughter about
the Magna Carta, collapses as she tries to deny the constitutional
imperative of jury trials.5" We hear the Court's mind set like concrete not
once,5' but several times. 2 Having heard that dialogue, we are unsurprised
to read Justice White writing for the Court that the jury trial right carries
"impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta."53 Indeed, a
refocus that spotlights the lawyer's circumstance has special value
because, in decisions, the Court infrequently criticizes the litigants
themselves.54 Justices are less restrained with criticism, however, during
oral argument.5 No lawyer reprimanded in open court ever forgets the
46. Id. at 684.
47. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 13, 1997, at clip 37, Clinton, 520 U.S. 681
(No. 95-1853), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
48. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 3, 1997, at clip 38, United States
v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (No. 96-1133), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (criticizing an attorney for failing to attribute a quote to a dissenting opinion).
49. 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (finding that Louisiana violated the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment's jury trial provision by denying Duncan a jury trial).
50. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 17, 1968, at clip 39, Duncan, 391 U.S. 145
(No. 410), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm.
51. Hear id. at clip 40 (questioning the circumstances under which the Constitution would
require a jury trial).
52. Hear id. at clips 41-42 (questioning again the principle upon which Attorney Wolbrette
wished the Court to base its decision).
53. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151. Justice White was the Justice whose questions about the Magna
Carta Attorney Wolbrette dismissed with a laugh. Footnote 16 tersely further develops this
controversy, pitting Blackstone against "[h]istorians [who] no longer accept this pedigree." Id. at
151 n.16.
54. But cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[lIt
is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional
liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by
extreme and dubious legal arguments.").
55. Judicial admonitions heard aloud vividly impress how trust in a lawyer can gust away.
Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 20, 1990, at clip 43, Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S.
292 (1990) (No. 88-1972), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm (attorney's
mischaracterization of case law provokes questioning Justice to insist on a "promise" not to refer
to the precedent again during argument). For example, the Court's 5-4 ruling in Arizona v.
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reprimand, yet without attention to controversies in the Court, as well as
the way they are decided by the Court, we rarely hear how judges hoe,
trench, and weed professionalism in the ranks of lawyers on a day-to-day
basis.5
6
A last lesson worth highlighting from how lawyers use facts in
controversy before the Court-and how this use can be decisive-is that
the factual universe never entirely closes. Whereas scholars unaccustomed
to litigation often assume that records become fixed, a look into the
courtroom reveals that lawyers continue to enlarge the record up to, and
past, submission to the Supreme Court. Litigants expand the record to
focus the Court's doubt on the other side's proof, and have done so
determinatively in significant constitutional cases. 7
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), that constitutional errors may be subject to harmless-error
analysis, id. at 311-12, also divided 5-4 on whether a prison confession had been involuntary.
Compare id. at 287 (involuntary), with id. at 305-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (not involuntary).
In the final minutes of rebuttal argument, the Senior Assistant Attorney General of Arizona
attempted to characterize a government inmate informant's threat as no more "than perhaps
ostracizing him and ignoring him [Fulminante]," which prompted this retort, consistent with the
bare majority's eventual ruling: "Do you think that's what they mean by a rough time in prison?
They call you names?" Transcript of Oral Argument on Oct. 10, 1990, Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(No. 89-839), available at 1990 WL 601347, at *49; hear also Recording of Oral Argument on Feb.
22, 23, 1972, at clip 44, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Nos. 70-85, 70-94, 70-57),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm (criticizing the government attorney for
poor briefing of the issues because the submitted brief was only a few pages long and contained
virtually no law); Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 23, 1993, at clip 45, Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764(1993)(Nos. 91-1111,91-1128), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm (admonishing a lawyer who avoided answering questions); Recording of
Oral Argument on Apr. 16, 2002, at clip 46, BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002)
(No. 01-518), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (urging a lawyer to listen
more closely).
56. In Branzburg, in spite of the aforementioned criticism of the poor government argument,
supra note 55, the Court's decision demonstrates how the Court will often necessarily announce
a constitutional rule that favors a party whose advocacy was deficient. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
Likewise, access to advocacy confirms that Justices whose questions imply one outcome may later
author an opinion concluding the opposite. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 8,
1986, at clip 47, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 85-660), http://www.floridalaw
review.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Justice Marshall asking incredulously, "You mean a man can't
confess?"), with Connelly, 479 U.S. at 174 (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should affirm the Colorado Supreme Court's decision since Connelly could not make
an "intelligent" decision). These truths are reassurances that the constitutional discussion carried
out with lawyers during oral argument, highlighted in this Article, indeed do begin the next-in-time
discussion among Justices, cf supra note 8, which scholars can and do explore when access to
Justices' internal materials is possible. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997)
(comprehensively reviewing the development of constitutional law with reference, especially, to
Justice Marshall's papers, as well as other Court materials and sources).
57. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 10, 1967, at clip 48, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing in
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Two examples of outcome-determinative facts raised to the Court-yet
not acknowledged in casebook excerpts--occurred in the arguments that
framed the landmark decisions in Chimel v. California58 and Sheppard v.
Maxwell." In Chimel, the Court invalidated under the Fourth Amendment
the warrantless search of a home as incident to an arrest. 6° During oral
argument, Attorney Monroe goes outside the record and successfully
attacks warrantless home searches--conducted by the Los Angeles police
as "incident to arrest" authority-with an argument that the Los Angeles
police sought only 225 home search warrants in 1 year in a city with more
than 7 million residents.61 In Sheppard, the Court found that media
publicity denied the defendant a fair trial.62 Ohio Attorney General
William Saxbe unsuccessfully attempted to block the Court's
consideration of evidence of media publicity prejudice that denied
Sheppard his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.63
B. Constitutional Controversy Reconciles Law
As to legal argument, an advocacy shift highlights different lessons
significant to constitutional doctrine. Studying the adversarial process of
arriving at a decision shows that doctrine emerges before it is written. Yet
because casebooks devote overriding attention to decisions, students study
these last things first, an order that obscures how issues are shaped or
misshaped as they advance or are back-pulled through litigation.
Lawyers who master antecedent rulings and work done in their case
before the Supreme Court,' and integrate a breadth of pertinent caselaw,65
favor of Virginia's anti-miscegenation law), with id. at clip 49 (calling attention to a conspicuous
omission in the State's previously quoted authority).
58. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
59. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
60. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
61. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 27, 1969, at clip 50, Chimel, 395 U.S. 752
(No. 770), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm.
62. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63.
63. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 28, 1966, at clip 51, Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333
(No. 490), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
64. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 10, 1967, at clip 52, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (quoting at
length-and as "ludicrous"--the trial judge's opinion that "Almighty God created the races... and
he placed them on separate continents"); hear also Recording of Oral Argument on June 26, 1971,
at clip 53, N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Nos. 1873, 1885),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (seeking to overturn publication restraints
as violative of the First Amendment, Attorney Bickel for the New York Times highlights the
government's failure to persuade "two fine district court judges [and] two fine courts of appeals");
Recording ofOral Argument on Nov. 30, 1981, at clip 54, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)
(No. 79-1738), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (seeking to sue former
President Nixon for an unjust job dismissal, Attorney Nolan emphasizes both the district court
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speak fluidly about the present-mindedness of law, which is what judges
seek. This occurs, for example, with startling immediacy in the following
exchange in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer66 when Solicitor
General Perlman reminded Justice Jackson of seizure activity he
authorized as Attorney General during World War II:
JUSTICE JACKSON: I looked it [his case as Attorney
General] up because I wondered how much of this was laid at
my door.
SOLICITOR GENERAL PERLMAN: Your Honor, we lay a
lot of it at your door.
JUSTICE JACKSON: Perhaps rightly.
I claimed everything, of course, like every other Attorney
General does. It was a custom that did not leave the
Department of Justice when I did.67
This frank recollection is consistent with Justice Jackson's concurrence,
trumping "the imperatives of events" over "enigmatic" framers' intentions,
ruling and "news" that Fitzgerald went from being a sophisticated weapons analyst to a bowling
alley inspector in Thailand). Cf Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 23, 1987, at clip 55, Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (No. 85-2068), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (advocate unable to answer whether person hoped President would be assassinated
gratefully accepts interceding Justice's reference to findings); Recording of Oral Argument on Feb.
26, 2002, at clip 56, Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (No. 01-344),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Q: "Where do we find these? A: "Your
Honor, I'm sorry, I don't have the reference cites."); Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 8, 1986,
at clip 57, Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (No. 85-660), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (advocate pressed with difficult questions about whether his client was coerced into
confession is chided by interceding Justice for failing to emphasize client's mental vulnerability).
65. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 21, 1969, at clip 58, Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (No. 138), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (cataloguing constitutionally authoritative "difficulties" his opponent dodges, Attorney
Arthur Kinoy then reduced his opponent's argument to the infamous British parliamentary-
expulsion Wilkes case), with Powell, 395 U.S. at 527 (rejecting any constitutional rule that would
approximate "the most notorious English election dispute of the 18th century-the John Wilkes
case"). Cf Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 20, 1990, at clip 59, Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S.
292 (1990) (No. 88-1972), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (questioning
Attorney Dan Evers for respondent Perkins to state best case available, the Court then questioned
the stated case's aptness).
66. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
67. Transcript of Oral Argument on May 12, 1953, Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (Nos. 744,
745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 920.
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"cryptic" text, and "indecisive" precedent.6" And this exchange elucidates
these concurring sentences by Justice Jackson:
The claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential powers
has long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political
controversy. While it is not surprising that counsel should
grasp support from such unadjudicated claims of power, a
judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the
attorney for one of the interested parties as authority in
answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was
himself.69
The stretching of precedent-not just endorsing7" or
distinguishing 7 -proves that borrowing is not "clinging to."'72 In fact,
advocacy shows that borrowing powerfully can be "refusing." Talented
lawyers attempt to tell the Court what will remain undisturbed,73
68. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634, 635, 637, 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 647.
70. In the following exchange, endorsement veers towards pandering. Hear Recording of
Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, at clip 60, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Q: "Mr. Attorney General, does the fact
that I am still alive add strength to the opinion?" A: "May it please the Court, I think that that
opinion must live for centuries yet to come."). Or, in this second exchange, counsel offers precedent
without firsthand recollection and fails to produce the case cited to the Court upon further
questioning. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 11, 2000, at clip 61, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5,99-29), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (Q: "Where does it say that .... A: "I don't have the opinion with me right here." Q:
"Well, if it's the only opinion you're relying on... I'd like to know what language suggests that.").
71. Consider two more illuminating moments that display advocacy beyond distinguishing
difficult precedent-both taken from Baker: "[W]e recognize that in Colegrove versus Green[, 328
U.S. 549 (1946),] we have a major problem of distinguishing what we consider to be a
misunderstood decision .... I'm not agreeing with your opinion [in Colgrove]. I'm merely
distinguishing it from this case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter." Transcript of Oral Reargument on Oct.
9, 1961, Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (No. 6), reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGuMENTS,Supra
note 1, at 560-61. Separately during oral argument, counsel was rebuked for the citation of a
decision based on its subsequent treatment, instead of the holding itself. Hear Recording of
Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, at clip 62, Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (No. 6), http://www.floridalaw
review.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("That isn't the way I read a case. I read the case for an opinion
to find out what the opinion said, although later on it may have had a different history.").
72. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 24, 2004, at clip 63, Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624) (arguing that "fourteen separate Justices"
have articulated a significant difference between a purely religious exercise and a ceremonial
reference and that these articulations are "more than dicta"), with Transcript of Oral Argument on
Mar. 24, 2004, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), available at 2004 WL 736416, at *19
("[F]orget the, forget all that dicta for just a moment.").
73. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 7, 1989, at clip 64, Univ. of
Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (No. 88-493),
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reassuring that large steps asked of the Court will have quiet footfalls.74
Indeed, listening to successful argument, one hears caution. Harsh
constitutional talk is soothingly spoken and ambition is kept small,"
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (distinguishing the instant case from cited
decision after cited decision of First Amendment rulings protecting "the world of ideas"--"this is
not that").
74. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on June 26, 1971, at clip 65, N.Y. Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Nos. 1873, 1885), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (responding to a hypothetical proposed that media right of publication would cause the
death of U.S. draftees, Attorney Bickel first cautions that the hypothetical will not occur, then
argues that it would make bad separation-of-powers law, but then concedes "it's almost impossible
to resist the inclination not to let that information be published, of course"); Recording
of Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, at clip 66, Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (No. 6),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm (frank exchange relating to court-ordered
reapportionment about whether and when, through history, the Court has considered that elected
officials will not comply with Court orders or suggestions); Recording of Oral Argument on Mar.
18, 1980, at clip 67, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (No. 78-6386),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (disclaiming suggested "floodgate
problem" because in the past 200 years arguably only one prior similar case was presented). There
are counterpoint lessons too, when attorneys do not sufficiently reassure and a step is not taken. Cf
Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 19,2000, at clip 68, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000) (No. 99-5525), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Solicitor General
Seth Waxman, as respondent, rejecting as too radical for "four reasons" petitioner's request to
overturn Miranda).
75. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30, 1992, at clip 69, New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, 90-563),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing that Garcia should not be
overruled); Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 10, 1995, at clip 70, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing that
Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause, Attorney Jean Dubofsky disclaims
an intention to overturn Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). Cf Recording of Oral
Argument on Nov. 30, 1981, at clip 71, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (No. 79-1738),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (connecting ambitious request for
"absolute immunity" for the President to the near impossibility of effectively representing a former
President of the United States in a lawsuit relating to his official duties). Thus, whereas casebook
decisional excerpts thrive on doctrine overturned, an advocacy shift shows that winning lawyers
very often disavow an intention to overrule sweepingly, even when the Court itself elects ultimately
to reverse doctrine. In the significant case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), for example,
Attorney A.L. Kearns, for Mapp, rejected a desire to apply the exclusionary rule to states, hear
Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 29, 1961, at clip 72, Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (No. 236),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3 list.htm (arguing not to overrule Wolfv. Colorado,
388 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, and require exclusion in state proceedings
of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search); Attorney Bernard Berkman, for the
ACLU as amicus curiae, only touched on that eventual holding, hear id. at clip 73 (noting tersely
that the ACLU was asking the Court to reconsider WolD; and the government gave only short,
unsuspecting comments about this wide-ranging eventuality. Hear id. at clip 74 (noting
reliance by the government on Wol; hear also Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 12,
1985, at clip 75, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Attorney David Niehaus disclaiming
[Vol. 60
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whereas grand unsuccessful attempts sound with fury.76
An advocacy shift also shows that almost any case teeters on a fine
point between failure and success; and that adversarial testing dislodges
most certainties in favor of reconciled opposites. Advocacy teaches this
encouraging lesson by demonstrating the vitality of lawyering, as well as
the moral that lawyers must recognize and judges enforce: "that competing
values each have merit yet still oppose each other, and must somehow be
brought together so that as much as possible of the good in each can be
protected and preserved.""
A professional shift bolsters this lesson by forcing awareness of both
sides to every question. The full orbit of pros and cons-and the insightful,
failed, or outwitted advocacy that conjures them-lies just beneath the
surface of every decision propounded by the Court.7 8 Indeed, it is the
promise of Marbury v. Madison,79 essential to the rule of law, that the
judicial department receive and examine "conflicting rules."8° When
intention to overturn Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), but instead to reconsider the case).
Compare Transcript of Oral Argument on Oct. 17, 1967, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (No. 35), reprinted in 65 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note !, at 110
(tiptoeing through the Court's precedents, Attorney Harvey Schneider contends only that the Court
had already implicitly overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part
by Katz, 389 U.S. 347), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (reversing Olmstead); compare Recording of
Oral Reargument on Oct. 1, 1984, at clip 76, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985) (Nos. 82-1913, 82-1951), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(answering Justice Blackmun, Solicitor General Rex Lee firmly responds that "the entire approach
[of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528]
is sound"), with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (Justice Blackmun reverses his fifth vote and overturns
National League).
76. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 5, 1964, at clip 77,
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm (declaiming against aggregating intrastate commercial activity to warrant
congressional civil rights intervention, Attorney Moreton Rolleston, Jr., is stopped mid-crescendo).
77. APPELLATE JUDICIALOP1NIONS 235 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974) (summarizing Cardozo's
philosophy of law).
78. The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for example, which remains
as pivotal as it is controversial, is best understood by constitutional participants of any
opinion if they hear the many viewpoints submitted to the Court. Compare Recording of
Oral Argument on Dec. 13, 1971, at clip 78, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing about when life begins, Texas
Assistant Attorney General Jay Floyd is asked whether the proposition before the Court is "a legal
question, a constitutional question, a medical question, a philosophical question, a religious
questions.. .what is it?"), with id., at clip 79 (answering the Court, Attorney Sarah Weddington,
in quick order, has her argument tested against medical ethics, against constitutional safeguards "at
the other end of life's span," and against personhood in the Fourteenth Amendment).
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
80. Id. at 178; hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 17, 18, 1966, at clip
80, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No. 22), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm (before adjournment to decide the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, the Court commends "more than half the states of the Union" for submitting views on "on
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assessment extends not merely to outcome, but to whether the Court
engaged a full plethora of viewpoints, decisions of "peculiar
delicacy" 8 -where judicial supremacy is asserted-gain legitimacy.
Indeed, some issues are complex enough that we do well to remind
ourselves-when an outcome necessarily is chosen-that the Court
wrestled with polarizing and multifaceted angles that each of us may
embrace differently.
Consider capital punishment, where the Court's end-product decisions
are as divisive as they are decisive. Precisely for that reason, scholars
should report on the variability of arguments that advocates asked the
Court to reconcile. There is a reassuring discomfort to the divergent
reasons the Court entertains before announcing its constitutional holding.
For example, when the Court, unsurprisingly, was told death-is-different
as an argument against the constitutionality of executions, we also hear
Solicitor General Robert Borkpoint out that if death is different, it is so in
a punishment-favoring sense. 1We hear that executions deter crime; then,
that they contribute to crime." We are asked-if the academy will listen
alongside the Justices-to consider whether the Constitution can condemn
itself;84 whether we trust our founding Fathers; 85 trust the Court; 86 and
even, ourselves.87 From any perspective, we rehear the range of concerns
both sides of the question").
81. Cf Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 24, 1972, at clip 34, U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297 (No. 70-153), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Attorney Kinoy
referring to such cases as ones where the Court acts as "the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution").
82. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30, 1976, at clip 81, Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (No. 75-5394), vacated, 429 U.S. 875 (1976),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (describing the uniqueness of death as final
and unknowable, in an argument against the constitutionality of punishment by death under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), with id, at clip 82 (describing the uniqueness of death as an
effective deterrent, in an argument for the constitutionality of punishment by death).
83. Compare id., at clip 83 (arguing that academic evidence and common sense
support the deterrence effect of executions), with Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31,
1976, at clip 84, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (No. 75-5491),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("The death penalty may be the greatest
obstacle to adequate enforcement of crime in this country today .... ").
84. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30, 1976, at clip 85, Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (No.
75-5394), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (stating that it would be an
"anomaly" to now condemn procedures that the Constitution created); hear also id. at clip 86
(noting that competing values in the Constitution must be resolved, rather than obliterating one at
the expense of the other).
85. Hear id. at clip 87 (noting the Framers' "understanding" that the Eighth Amendment was
"not to alter existing practices, but was to prevent intolerable innovations or reversions").
86. Hear id. at clip 88 (emphasizing confidence in the Court as one whose role is "not a
super-legislature" and "not the keeper ... of the social values and the conscience and moral values
of the people of this country").
87. Hear id. at clip 89 ("[U]ltimately these five cases are cases about democratic
government" to choose or reject the death penalty).
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the Constitution must accommodate, such as whether we would prohibit
execution of a Buchenwald commandant or a fanatic who detonates a
hydrogen bomb in New York City, or whether life imprisonment may be
more "cruel" than capital punishment.88
Advocacy materials clarify the Court's pursuit of reconciled opposites,
telling lawyers that if their proposed rule means that their side always
wins, the rule will lose.89 This fundamental concept cannot be overtaught,
both for the development of constitutional law and also for individual
lawyering advantage. Yet casebooks contain virtually no analysis of how
lawyering produces judicial outcomes.
The study of advocacy illuminates other aspects of lawyering and the
development of the law. First, not infrequently, rulings can be heard being
decided during moments when lawyering mixes audibly into judging. For
example, Congress's contention that its exclusion of Congressman Powell
was immune from judicial review-based on Speech or Debate Clause
impermeability-audibly crested into impossibility in this sequence of
questions and answers during argument in Powell v. McCormack:
QUESTION: Suppose he had been excluded because of his
race in the form of a resolution, would you say that he would
have any judicial remedies?
ANSWER: I should say, Sir, in answer to that question that
the action of the House would be clearly unconstitutional.
QUESTION: But would he have judicial remedy?
ANSWER: But as I read the Speech or Debate Clause, he
would not, Sir [long silence] .9
Petitioner Francis Connelly's argument that a confession to police that
is induced by mental infirmity violates due process broke down precisely
when Attorney Nathan Coats could not describe when confessions to guilt
ever would be "voluntary."'" Federal Public Defender Frank Dunham, Jr.,
successful on other grounds in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,92 stumbled similarly,
88. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31, 1976, at clip 90, Woodson, 428 U.S. 280
(No. 75-5491), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
89. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1998) ("Because there is no
stopping point to the logic of petitioner's argument, we find it unpersuasive.").
90. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 21, 1969, at clip 91, Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969) (No. 138), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm/.
91. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 8, 1986, at clip 92, Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 85-660), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("I
understand there's a problem in the limits that can be drawn [as to when confessions of guilt ever
are voluntary] .... I'm not sure I can satisfactorily draw any limits.").
92. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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and irrecoverably, with his overarching argument against executive
detentions of citizen-combatants.93 There are many further significant
illustrations of this point.
The Court's refusal in Apodaca v. Oregon94 to find a constitutional
imperative for juror unanimity in criminal trials emerged from a decidedly
structural and originalist clarification during oral argument when it was
noted that the Framers of the Constitution thought a non-unanimous vote
of two thirds would suffice for as serious an outcome as presidential
impeachment.95
Similarly, during argument in the landmark United States v. Salerno
case,96 this brusque criminal justice exchange foreshadows the Court's
subsequent outcome upholding the congressional statutory apparatus that
permits pretrial detention of dangerous persons:
QUESTION: [What if you] have solid evidence ... that he's
maybe going to leave the jurisdiction?
ANSWER: Put him in jail.
QUESTION: Put him in jail. You have solid evidence that
he's associating with people that he shouldn't?
ANSWER: Put him in jail.
QUESTION: Third, you have very good evidence that he's
about to kill somebody.
ANSWER: Nope.97
And, as a final example, casebooks excerpt United States Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton98 as a recent, significant decision that states cannot alter
qualifications for Congress that are enumerated in the Constitution. But
students will better appreciate both the lawyer's task and constitutional
93. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 28, 2004, at clip 93, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507
(No. 03-6696), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (admitting that inherent
Presidential power to kill enemy combatants exists, but simultaneously arguing against executive
power to detain them).
94. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
95. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 1, 1971, at clip 94, Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404
(No. 69-5046), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htin (noting that presidential
impeachment, a serious matter, requires only two-thirds voter approval).
96. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
97. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 21, 1987, at clip 95, Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(No. 86-87), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
98. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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growth if they juxtapose Arkansas Attorney General J. Winston Bryant's
firm anti-incumbency beginning with his argument's textualist collapse
twenty minutes later under a barrage of perplexed questions by the Court.99
More generally, academic alchemy should test its own worth by
measurement against the line along which the case-and-controversy scalpel
cuts. We hear originalism as a decision-making priority alive and loud,'00
but often elusive, as lawyers struggle to overcome the variability that
comes with discerning centuries-old motives. I1 Structural constitutional
implications are urged trenchantly,'0 2 and textualism, even as an
afterthought, commands attention.0 3
It is an oversight that constitutional scholarship endorses these
modalities of constitutional decision-making, yet casebooks do not link to
the advocacy that pushed these concepts-advocacy that this Article
shows is readily available. In the arguments that framed the Court's
impeachment method decision in Nixon v. United States,"° for example,
the rapier-like interplay of textualism, structuralism, and originalism
stands out as the opposing lawyers urge the Court to amplify meaning
from constitutional syntax.0 5 Early in the argument, in fact, the late Chief
99. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 29, 1994, at clip 96, U.S. Term
Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. 779 (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (defending Arkansas's constitutional authority to encourage rotation of delegates and
its authority to add additional qualifications), with id. at clip 97 ("General Bryant, this is a very
remarkable proposition . . . does your argument depend in any way on this most unusual
interpretation?").
100. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 10, 1967, at clip 98, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing that
there is no reason to read into the original Constitution a power to veto state legislation that the
Framers explicitly excluded).
101. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 21,1989, at clip 99, Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (No. 88-155), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("Do
you suppose Patrick Henry and any of the Founding Fathers ever showed disrespect to the Union
Jack ... do you think they had in mind then, in drafting the First Amendment, that it should be a
prosecutable offense [to bum the American Flag]?").
102. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 14, 1992, at clip 100, Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (No. 91-740), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(arguing in favor of judicial review of impeachments by juxtaposition to the Framers' explicit
insertion into the Pardon Clause of a denial of executive intercession in cases of impeachment).
103. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 13, 1971, at clip 101, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (asking
"what provisions of the Constitution you rely on" to infer support for a woman's right to choose
abortion). Cf Recording of Oral Reargument on Oct. 28, 29, 1957, at clip 102, Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958) (No. 70), http://www.fioridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("[W]hetheryou
call it lack of power, lack of due process, or an attempt to inflict a cruel and unusual
punishment ... it all adds up to the same single result that this [desertion] is not something for
which Congress can take away the nationality of an American born.").
104. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
105. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 14, 1992, at clip 103, Nixon, 506 U.S.
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Justice Rehnquist quipped ironically about textualist tags. 106
Additionally, advocacy demonstrates not only that decisions are made
by, and responsive to, lawyers' arguments, but also that ignoring the
exchange between lawyers and judges strips decisions of vital formative
information. 10
7
224 (No. 91-740), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (discussing what the
Framers meant by the word "try"); id. at clip 104 (disagreeing that the text of the Constitution
provides one answer about what "to try" means); id. at clip 105 (acknowledging that text, structure,
and "the end result" are all considerations relevant to the Court's decision).
106. Hear id. at clip 106 ("Well, Mr. Stewart, you refer to it as the Impeachment Trial Clause.
It says the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachment-you might just as well refer
to it as the Sole Power Clause.").
107. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) ("If the Government does not
consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that
Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has
taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi's detention could last for the rest
of his life."), with Transcript of Oral Argument on Apr. 28, 2004, at 50, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No.
03-6696), available at 2004 WL 1066082, at *42 (Q: "But doesn't the Court have some business
intervening at some point, if it's the Hundred Years War or something?" A: "Well, Justice Breyer,
I mean, there may be a point where, depending on the nature of the war-I mean, I'm not quite
sure what you have in mind that they would intervene on."); compare Recording of Oral
Argument on Feb. 22, 1982, at clip 107, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (No. 80-1832),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing that the Framers' constitutional
text is clear and determinative, and exceptions are explicit, provoking the question: "Well, what
makes you think that you're going to find explicit provisions for everything that Congress can do
in the Constitution?"), with Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 ("The choices we discern as having been made
in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem
clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who
had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go
unchecked."); compare Nixon, 506 U.S. at 253-54 (Souter, J., concurring) (signaling that political-
question insularity might not excuse an impeachment "[i]f the Senate were to act in a manner
seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a
summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply 'a bad guy' (quoting id.
at 239 (White, J., concurring))), with Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 14, 1992, at clip 108,
Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (No. 91-740), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(questioning whether the Court could review impeachment by coin toss), id. at clip 109
(questioning the constitutionality of impeachment for being "a bad guy"), and id. at clip 110
(questioning the constitutionality of impeachment for "poisoning a neighbor's cat"); compare
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 & n.45 (1975) ("[W]hatever else may be said of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable
worth of free choice." (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I)), and id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(concluding that "the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make
a fool of himself"), with Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 (No. 73-
5772), microformedon The Complete Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States
1974 Term (Univ. Publ'ns. of Am.) (arguing for Petitioner Faretta's right to represent himself at
trial, Attorney Jerome Falk states: "At the philosophical level, I think we have to conclude that
constitutional rights are not dependent for their existence on the ability of the person who owns
them, has them, and to exercise them intelligently or well. The right of free speech can be exercised
by an utter fool .... ).
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For example in the landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,1°9 Chief Justice Vinson in dissent wrote: "Nor is there any
question of unlimited executive power in this case. The President himself
closed the door to any such claim when he sent his Message to Congress
stating his purpose to abide by any action of Congress, whether approving
or disapproving his seizure action."' 9 During oral argument, however,
Solicitor General Perlman's attempt to make this argument was
convincingly challenged:
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You say that Congress did
not do anything, although the President invited them to. I
want to know what the legal significance of that non-action
is in this case.
MR. PERLMAN: I think it can be inferred from their failure
to act that they were content to let the Presidential action
stand.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: We have a very wide range
of opinions of the Court to the effect that non-action is not to
be so regarded.
MR. PERLMAN: Under these circumstances, in the teeth of
the two messages asking Congress to accept responsibility,
telling Congress that he would abide by anything that
Congress passed, then I think if Congress did not suggest
anything different from what the President had done, it can be
inferred that Congress was quite satisfied with the situation.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: What does that mean
legally? All you can say is that they were satisfied to let this
stand. That is all, isn't it?
MR. PERLMAN: Yes, that is all. But I will come to an
argument here that usage and custom has a bearing on the
solution of this problem. "0
However, Solicitor General Perlman never did "come" to the promised
argument. 1
108. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
109. Id. at 701.
110. Transcript of Oral Argument on May 12, 1952, Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (Nos. 744,
745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 908.
111. This indebtedness to litigants can be true even when the Court writes that credit for a
doctrinal shift was its own. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("Because
of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance
to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The
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In short, not equipping our constitutional audience, and law students
especially, with the lawyering behind the cases we study asks them to leap
the chasm from the academy into practice in two jumps. The corrective is
not an occasional frolic into the advocate's world, but wholesale casebook
reconfiguration. Instead of disembodied leaps from landmark decisions to
scholarly exegesis, casebooks should link comprehensively to the lower
court evolution of the case, certiorari filings, briefs, and argument in a
case. Grafting this sequence is available, free, time-effective, and needed.
C. Constitutional Controversy Illuminates Where We Are Going, or
Will Not Go
A third significant lesson is that lawyers never stop trying to move
courts their way, but must also demonstrate the mistake of going any other
way. During the final moments of argument in Baker v. Carr, there is this
consequential exchange:
THE COURT: [M]y question was-accept that you succeed
in having this statute declared unconstitutional. My question
was to foresee the next step. Couldn't your legislature, with
entire conscientiousness, then ... pass a reapportionment
statute which from your point of view would raise the same
questions which are now brought here?
MR. OSBORN: No, they could not.
THE COURT: They could not?
MR. OSBORN: With good conscience, and on a rational
basis-
THE COURT: Not with your conscience, but with their
conscience.
MR. OSBORN: No. Both of us are supposed to have the
conscience provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a 'constitutionally protected area' .... But this
effort to decide whether or not a given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally protected'
deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." (footnotes omitted)), with Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 17, 1967, at
clip 111, Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
("[W]e feel that the emphasis on whether or not you have a constitutionally protected area may be
placing the emphasis on the wrong place.., we feel that the right to privacy follows the individual
and that whether or not he is in a space enclosed by four walls and a ceiling and a roof.., is not
determinative of the issue ....").
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THE COURT: And there never would be difference of
opinion on this point?
THE COURT: Can you imagine any case where we hold a
law unconstitutional, where there's a decided sentiment
against what we hold in the community, where the legislature
wouldn't try to pass another to try to trim it as much as
possible?
MR. OSBORN: Always they have done that.
THE COURT: Has that heretofore been held a reason why we
shouldn't hold them unconstitutional if they are?
MR. OSBORN: Never has this Court failed to have the
courage to do what it thought was right. 112
Persuasive constitutional advocacy "foresee[s] the next step" and
makes an opponent's solution the problem." 3 But we often do not study
this endeavor because casebook decisions subordinate attorney argument,
and especially attorney policy argument." 4
Even the angriest dissents often do not match the predictive harm
lawyers muster to arouse the dissent,"15 not to mention those warnings
112. Transcript of Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(No. 6), reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 689.
113. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 2, 1983, at clip 112, J.E.B v. Alabama
exrel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127(1994)(No. 92-1239), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm ("[T]he solution that petitioner has offered in this case I think causes a great many
more problems than it actually fixes.").
114. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (Little, Brown & Co.
1948) (1881) ("The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned... [based on] more or less
definitely understood views of public policy .... ).
115. Consider two decisions, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), in which Justice Scalia argued in dissent that Congress and the
Executive were surrendering, or having stripped from them, constitutionally assigned duties,
respectively. Compare Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("By reason of today's
decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more
attractive in the future .... I foresee all manner of 'expert' bodies, insulated from the political
process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How
tempting to create an expert [commission] . . .to dispose of. . .thorny, 'no-win' political
issues .... This is an undemocratic precedent that we set...."), with Transcript of Oral Argument,
Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (Nos. 87-7028,87-1904), available at 1988 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 26, at *39
("[I]t certainly is handy... [t]o just simply say, why go through all the trouble of hammering [out]
a new securities law? Let's just create an agency and say, hey, promulgate a securities law.");
compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 714-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his statute does deprive the
President of substantial control over the prosecutory functions performed by the independent
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credible enough to sway a majority.1 6 For example, students who study
constitutional doctrine should listen to Federal Public Defender Frank
Dunham's command for judicial intervention in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,17 in
which he argues that enemy combatants can be detained only under law."'
By contrast, in arguments that framed the Court's decision in Gregg v.
Georgia,"9 the government successfully contends that justice, though due
to the accused, is due to the accuser too.1 20
The centrality of lawyer warnings in all litigation, including
constitutional controversy, is evident from any sampling of advocacy,
whether or not it loses visibility in decisional outcomes. Even when a
lawyer loses footing, he can compensate for an inability to say what the
Court's position should be if he knows what it cannot be. 21 Moreover,
counsel, and it does substantially affect the balance of powers."), with Recording of
Oral Argument on Apr. 26, 1988, at clip 113, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm (describing the Framers' concern of an
unaccountable absolute power and consequently vesting the Executive power in the President and
no one else, as a position accountable to the people); and id. at clip 114 (highlighting the radical
divestment of power from a single presidential perspective to institutional control).
116. To propel the Court to its decision in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969),
attorney Arthur Kinoy angrily and decisively exclaimed that Congress was aggregating power
reserved exclusively to the people. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 21, 1969, at clip 115,
Powell, 395 U.S. 486 (No. 138), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
Similarly, albeit in more subdued tone, Solicitor General Rex Lee opposed the legislative veto in
INSv. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), by predicting an irreversible, dire contraction of governmental
power. Hear Recording of Oral Reargument on Oct. 7, 1982, at clip 116, Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(Nos. 80-1832,80-2170,80-2171), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("This
is nothing less than an invitation to rewrite the Constitution in its most fundamental
respect .... And in fact, this case involves nothing less than that issue .... Congress could
eliminate the President's constitutionally vested power to participate in lawmaking and thereby
bring to pass the very result that was the Framers' most deeply held separation-of-powers
concern.").
117. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
118. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 28, 2004, at clip 117, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507
(No. 03-6696), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (imploring the Court to
"step up to the plate" and not to "trust us" when spoken by the Executive to detain citizens without
law).
119. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
120. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 31, 1976, at clip 118, Gregg, 428 U.S. 153
(No. 74-6257), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("We respectively submit
that the Constitution does not demand that the balance of fear weigh more heavily on the citizen
than on the potential capital criminal."); hear also Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 18, 1984,
at clip 119, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (No. 82-1651), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm (asking counsel for Williams about the "social cost the other way" if a
"plainly guilty defendant should go free from this grisly murder"). Nix dealt with whether the
inevitable discovery of a child's body rendered inapplicable the exclusionary rule's consequences
of a Miranda violation. Nix, 467 U.S. at 434, 437, 440-41.
121. Solicitor General Charles Fried, arguing in UnitedStates v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987),
acknowledged the difficulty ofpredicting dangerousness about pretrial incarcerees, hear Recording
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teaching that lawyer's doomsay allows effective lawyers to anticipate
Court inquiries about consequences; 22 and, perceiving this skill, to
apprehend the array of answers to policy scoldings. Students apprehend
the chilly answer that fidelity to our framing text leaves the judiciary no
room to problem solve.'23 Or warnings can be pierced as counter-factual
fearmongering. For example, in framing arguments leading to J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. TB.,'24 Attorney Lois Brasfield warned about the harms
of extending Batson v. Kentucky 25 to gender, 26 yet these predictions were
diminished when Justice Ginsburg elicited the concession thatjurisdictions
were already applying the ban.127
of Oral Argument on Jan. 21, 1987, at clip 120, Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (No. 86-87),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm, yet contended persuasively that
invalidating pretrial detention would be going from bad to worse. Hear id. at clip 121 ("The case
that haunts me is this: A person is released... [and] he then does indeed commit such a [violent]
crime. What is to be done about such a person? I take it on the logic of the argument, he must again
be released pending conviction. And if he commits yet another crime, he must again be released
until such time as there is a conviction. That, I think, is a situation... which I don't think we are
constitutionally required to admit in the face of a reasonable statute which seeks to do the
opposite."). Thus instructive for future lawyers, students can hear how attorneys sometimes must
argue for what may be bad-compared to what persuasively is shown to be worse. Hear, e.g.,
Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 14, 1992, at clip 122, Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
(1993) (No. 91-740), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing that an
unconstitutional impeachment would pose worse problems than concerns about judicial review of
impeachments).
122. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 28, 2004, at clip 123, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (arguing that the miltitary's own rules provide a guide for processing enemy combatants
in response to steady questions that judicial overlays on military affairs would prove unworkable).
Cf Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 2, 1997, at clip 124, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S.
398 (1998) (No. 96-1579), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (requesting the
"most abusive, unfait or otherwise improper result that you could conceive of' from the
Government's interpretation of the false statement statute that would impose criminal liability even
on a mere denial of wrongdoing, a so-called "exculpatory no"); id. at clip 125 (same).
123. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 28, Mar. 1, 2, 1966, at clip 126,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Nos. 759-761, 584), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm (answering a litigant's threat that "fewer convictions" are the inevitable
result of a prohibition on arrest-stage confessions by indicating that there is "no doubt" that a
prohibition on self-incrimination has that consequence); Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 3,
1996, at clip 127, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (contending that while some solutions to
problems cannot be reconciled with constitutional requirements, this issue in fact, albeit "rough and
ready," can and will save thousands of lives). The Court decided in Printz that the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act's requirements on state law enforcement officers imposed unconstitutional
obligations on state officers to execute federal laws. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 905.
124. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
125. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
126. Hear Recording ofOral Argument on Nov. 2, 1993, at clip 128,J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (No.
92-1239), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm.
127. Hear id. at clip 129 (Justice Ginsburg interrupts attorney warning that judiciary will be
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In arguments in United States v. Nixon, 2 ' Attorney James St. Clair was
undone by the inconsistencies in his threat that the Court was being used
as an adjunct of House impeachment proceedings. 29 In National League
of Cities v. Usery,130 Solicitor General Robert Bork forcefully responded
to his opponent's bleak forecast of the consequences of extending
congressional authority to city employees.' 3'
The importance of thinking through consequences, in short, proves
itself when we scratch beneath final decisions to investigate how the Court
bored down to perceive where opposing constitutional interpretations
might take us. Not surprisingly, that excavation, in turn, unearths other
bedrock concerns, above all showing that when lawyers propose a
constitutional rule for the future, they will be challenged to avoid both the
Scylla of an over-inclusive rule'32 and the Charybdis of an under-inclusive
one. 1
33
"loaded up" with difficulties applying Batson to gender and elicits acknowledgment that there is
no evidence of such "intractable problems" in jurisdictions already applying this prohibition.).
128. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
129. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on July 8, 1974, at clip 130, Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (No.
73-1766), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Attorney St. Clair concedes that
in spite of his contention of injury to Presidential communications from disclosure of tapes he in
fact claimed no knowledge of what was on those tapes.).
130. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
131. Hear Recording of Oral Reargument on Mar. 2, 1976, at clip 131, Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(No. 74-878), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Solicitor General Bork
sarcastically responds to his opponents' perceived dangers as untrue factually, albeit ones nearing
"a nuclear holocaust" in "emotional impact.").
132. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 15, 1991, at clip 132, Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (No. 90-1059),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (attacking the constitutionality of New
York's crime disgorgement statute by highlighting the breadth of speech that the statute might
cover); Recording ofOral Argument on Mar. 23, 1987, at clip 133, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378 (1987) (No. 85-2068), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (testing
the constitutionality of a criminal threat statute with questions about whether punishment would
extend to threateners of unintended protectees, like Quadafi); Recording of Oral Argument on
Feb. 22, 1971, at clip 134, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 299),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (questioning whether California's
"offensive conduct" statute used against Cohen for wearing ajacket labeled "FUCK THE DRAFT"
would mean that any pedestrian in Los Angeles who swears would be arrested); Recording of Oral
Argument on Jan. 13, 1997, at clip 135, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (testing an argument for Presidential
immunity from lawsuits with hypotheticals about a "child custody problem" or a President's "great
parcel of land somewhere.., bubbling up with poisons").
133. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 15, 1991, at clip 136, Simon & Schuster,
502 U.S. 105 (No. 90-1059), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (arguing that
the over-inclusive criminal disgorgement statute is also under-inclusive because it does not recoup
profits from other categories of felons); Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 22, 23, 1972, at
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IV. CONCLUSION
Why make an advocacy shift, then, if not because attorney materials
are free and casebooks are not, or because the Court itself asks for these
as blueprints to help it construe our Constitution? Looking more closely
at lawyering corrects, at least fractionally, several ways we understand our
Constitution.
The shift reveals more fully the process of lawyering and judging. It is
the adage that "if a man would be a soldier, he'd expect of course to fight."
Future lawyers learn best by listening to other lawyers win and lose. 34 An
advocacy focus also counteracts tendencies to reduce law to typecasts of
judges, to enlargen it to overcomplex doctrine, or to understand it as
immutable principle-three generalizations that misdirect towards
cynicism, "sportiveness of wit,"'135 and incivility, respectively. Advocacy
materials juxtaposed with outcomes reinforce a contrary law-sustaining
truth: that cases, at all levels, are won by attorneys who show utmost
frankness and assert positions of fact, law, and policy that judges come to
trust.'36 There may be no more exalted example of this axiom for
interpretative success than these minutes of upending federalist argument,
submitted by Attorney Abe Fortas, successfully seeking to overturn the
perceived states-rights logic behind Betts v. Brady37 which deprived
accused persons of appointed counsel except in special circumstances. 38
clip 137, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp31ist.htm (defending unsuccessfully against questions that proposed press "privilege"
would be inapplicable to professors, authors, and even the Framers of the Constitution); Recording
of Oral Argument on Mar. 24, 1997, at clip 138, Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (No.
96-5955), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (caught arguing about whether
the Government's no-knock rule applies to petty drug offenses, yet not murder); Recording of Oral
Argument on Mar. 21, 1989, at clip 139, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (No. 88-155),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (conceding to questions that burning the
Constitution would not be protected, although burning the state flag is protected); id. at clip 140
(conceding to questions that the cross is not protected); hear also Recording of Oral Argument on
Apr. 21, 1969, at clip 141, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (No. 138),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm/ (arguing that exclusion of an elected
congressman because of race, though unconstitutional, would not be sufficiently "perverse" to
warrant judicial relief as would "seizing the President and dragging him into the well of the House
under a resolution that he be beheaded").
134. See generally EDwARDH. WARREN, SPARTAN EDUCATION (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1942)
(discussing effective teaching methods for young lawyers).
135. 1 WILBoURN E. BENTON, 1787: DRAFrING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 30 (1986).
136. Cf Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 3,2004, at clip 142, Sabri v. United States, 541
U.S. 600 (2004) (No. 03-44), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm (admitting
"I don't know" prompts Chief Justice Rehnquist to observe: "that's a very candid answer").
137. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
138. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 15, 1963, at clip 143, Gideon v. Wainright,
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Lessons in proficiency do not stop, of course, with this Article's map
of how adversaries try persuasively to assemble propositions of fact, law,
and policy to impose a favored constitutional interpretation on us all.
Smaller lessons abound. Arguments must be clear.'39 Persuasion existsjust
in telling the Court that the actions under review ought to conform to
earlier judicial decree. 4 ' A first question is frequently a cocked pistol,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("I believe
that those [federalism] principles are misapplied here.., because a true regard, in my judgment,
Mr. Justice Harlan, for federalism here, means that this Court will lay down a principle, will
establish a principle, and that this Court will not exercise the kind of minute, detailed, ex post facto
supervision over state court trials that you have been exercising for these past years and which in
my opinion is the most corrosive possible way to administer our federal-state system .... I should
like to restate that very simply and very plainly, your Honor. I believe that Betts against Brady does
not incorporate a proper regard for federalism. I believe that Betts against Brady, laying down as
it does, the principle of case by case supervision by the federal courts of state criminal proceedings
is antithetical to federalism. Federalism requires, in my judgment, if your Honors please, that the
federal courts should refrain, so far as possible, from intervention in state criminal proceedings.
And certainly that where intervention is necessary because of a constitutional principle that that
intervention should be exercised in the least corrosive, the least aggressive fashion possible.").
139. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument on May 13, 1952, Youngstown Sheet& Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Nos. 744, 745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 958-59:
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You say that I can go any time to pick all the
apples and cherries I want, and I do not need permission to do that at any special
time.
MR. PERLMAN: That is not the Government's position.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Then I do not understand it.
MR. PERLMAN: I am sorry.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I am sorry, too.
Id. As valuable, lawyers must listen to lawyers who deftly recover from uncertainty, who do not
over-promise, and who convey a true desire to clarify a point of inquiry. Hear, e.g., Recording of
Oral Argument on Jan. 17, 1996, at clip 144, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No.
94-1941), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (understanding and agreeing
with a question from the Court, the attorney asks to restate the question for clarification); id. at clip
145 ("I think that I am saying that, and if I'm not answering the question, I'm not understanding
the question.").
140. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30, 1976, at clip 146, Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (No. 75-5394), vacated, 429 U.S. 875 (1976),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (describing actions taken by the state to
comply with the Court's earlier decision); id. at clip 147 ("So I went over and worked. We tried to
pour over Furman. We tried to understand it. What did Justice Berger say when he said he might
not like a mandatory sentence. What was the right thing to do?").
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prefiguring a constitutional outcome. 41 Answers often must be given to
questions that are hard to understand. 4 2 One must anticipate opponents
who will evade complexity with parables.'43 A rebuttal rejoinder should be
a final nail hammered in.'" Law professors indeed speak obscurely.'45
And, as one more lesson among many, law allows laughter.'46
141. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 8, 1994, at clip 148, United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm
(assessing whether in 1990 Congress had exceeded Commerce Clause powers for the first time in
more than halfa century, the Court's purpose to recalibrate came in the first question); hear also
Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 19, 2000, at clip 149, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (in assessing
whether Congress could overrule Miranda, the Court's decisional answer was forecast by this
opening observation that Miranda had been applied as a constitutional imperative against states).
142. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 3, 1962, at clip 150, Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (No. 468), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (admitting to
the Court that the attorney lost the question in the exchange); Recording of Oral Argument
on Feb. 26, 1974, at clip 151, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (acknowledging that the attorney forgot
the question, leading to "You have my permission to forget it."). Cf. Transcript of Oral Reargument
on Oct. 9, 1961, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), reprinted in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 691 (responding to an attorney comment that a question was
difficult, the attorney is asked, "[d]o you want me to put you easy ones?").
143. Hear Recording of Oral Reargument on Oct. 9, 1961, at clip 152, Baker, 369 U.S. 186
(No. 6), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (commencing oral argument by
comparing the Solicitor General with the priest and Levite who passed by the Good Samaritan).
144. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 26, 2000, at clip 153, Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
("If you have to dissect each butterfly in order to classify it, there are not going to be
many butterflies left."), hear also Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 22, 2005, at
clip 154, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("[T]he four words I think that this Court
should consider-and I'm not going to tell you the four since my red light is on.").
145. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 30, 1979, at clip 155, Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980) (No. 78-1076), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm
(attorney cites a law review article proposing the "rationale approach" to Miranda, but quickly
then is obliged to concede that, stripped of its academic phraseology, the article
advocates an "overruling approach" to Miranda). Cf Recording of Oral Argument on
Jan. 17, 1968, at clip 156, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (No. 410),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (sharp questions to an attorney who claims
an article was "cited," "recognized," and "used as authority" by the Court).
146. Acknowledging advocacy enlivens because lawyers balance the solemnity of judges.
There are more than ten thousand "laughter" moments in the last decade of argument in the
Supreme Court (easily searched on Westlaw's SCT-ORALARG" database or Lexis/Nexus' "U.S.
Trans" databases), but scholarship discusses almost none. Beyond mere lightness, these moments
are significant, often bearing out the maxim that "a joke's a very serious thing," hear, e.g.,
Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 5, 1998, at clip 157, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989) (No. 87-7028), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (recovering from
courtroom laughter about judges who "suffered an increase" in salary, the attorney discusses
whether presidential appointment of federal judges to the U.S. Sentencing Commission might
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Finally, incorporating advocacy corrects against constitutional
immodesty for the timeless reason that spoken argument makes truth more
disturbing. Poets like Toni Morrison remind us that words either crumble
in the mouth like ashes or, like birds, they sing, they fly.'47 This Article
echoes the same reminder that our Supreme Court must hear each side's
contradicting constitutional story before issuing its own pragmatic and
usually reconciled outcome. The value of this constitutional process is
easy to hear, and it is further proven by its negative, because it is
undeniably a loss that we cannot hear the government's clenched-teeth
constitutional arguments against Plessy and Korematsu, whose Supreme
Court oral arguments are missing.
In this regard, future generations will likely study as much how we
sought to persuade the Court into injustice as they will the decisional
injustice itself' 48 Students obtain a more nuanced perspective when they
hear viewpoints embedded in situational difficulty,'49 or pierced by the
infringe independence), or, in other cases, that one step from the sublime indeed may be the
ridiculous. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Nov. 29, 1976, at clip 158, Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (No. 75-1453), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3
list.htm (noting amidst courtroom laughter the irony that New Hampshire license plates "Live Free
or Die" are made in state prisons).
147. Toni Morrison, 1993 Nobel Prize in Literature Acceptance Speech (Dec. 7, 1993).
148. See Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L. J. 1135, 1142-45, 1151 (1989)
(investigating two different kinds of injustice).
149. See Transcript of Oral Argument on May 12, 1952, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Nos. 744, 745), reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 915:
MR. PERLMAN: [W]e submit that the source of the President's power must be
considered in the light of the circumstances of this case ....
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: 'The source of the President's power must be
considered in the light of the circumstances'? It is one thing to say circumstances,
but you do not derive the existence of a power from circumstances.
MR. PERLMAN: That is right. We say that the source must be there, and that
from the source comes the power. I did not say that you create power by the
circumstances.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I thought you did.
Id.; hear also Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 25, 2001, at clip 159, Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (Nos. 00-596,00-597), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (attorney breathlessly attempts to distinguish the problem of fast-food malnutrition
from cigarette use); Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 2, 1997, at clip 160, Brogan v. United
States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm
(attorney who cites eight appellate courts supporting the interpretation put forth is told, "That's a
fair point.., they ought to be here with you.").
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multifaceted angles litigants and amici offer. Responsibility properly
extends back to an idea's proponent,"' or settles between extreme
positions that were rejected. By contrast, responsibility lying with the
Court alone is sharpened, and should be, if one learns that refutations of
its announced constitutional rule went unanswered by a Court more
inclined to guard its law than to question it.
This observation circles back to my beginning, reiterating that
constitutional ideas must be spoken to before they explain themselves."'
The Constitution was authored long ago, and questions today confront us
with when, whether, and how to expound on it. We, the People, are
skeptical and discuss these questions with disagreement. That debate is
societal constitutional controversy-unhinged, except to personal
conscience or political purpose. Decisional constitutional controversy is
what judges do, and purports to be more constrained.
What is in-between-and today mostly missing from analysis-is the
controversy between the lawyers, whose constitutional discourse is more
hinged than the first, but less than the other. We should watch here more
than we do because it is in this middle that one first sees whether and how
our government grows tyrannical fighting tyranny'52-a raw viewpoint
often smoothed over in decision. Here, crucially, one can assess the full
public record of vigilance by the Court, wondering, cajoling, and
150. Reconsider the segregationist argument in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), and
Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), given earlier in this Article. See
supra notes 4-7, 9-11 and accompanying text.
151. Perhaps with purposive ambiguity, Justice Frankfurter had this exchange with Solicitor
General Perlman in Youngstown:
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Doctor Johnson said, you know, you can give
a person knowledge, but not understanding.
MR. PERLMAN: If that is meant for me, it is a dirty dig.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: It is meant for me.
Transcript of Oral Argument on May 12, 1952, Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (Nos. 744, 745),
reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 1, at 916.
152. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Feb. 24, 1972, at clip 161, United States v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (No. 70-153), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (uninterrupted challenge to arguments for executive wiretap authority as "the
precise arguments ... the Fourth Amendment was designed to eliminate"); Recording of Oral
Argument on Apr. 10, 1967, at clip 162, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (repeatedly interrupting Virginia's vague
answers and "labels" to compel acknowledgment and answer to the question, "[I]s there any doubt
in your mind that the object of these statutes, the basic premise on which they rest, is that the white
people are superior to the colored people and should not be permitted to marry... because it might
pollute the white race?").
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encouraging,' or chiding, blaming, and checking.'54 And here one hears
the grey zones of cases spoken about, whisperingly' or daringly,' 56
because lawyers and Justices in discourse are not bound by any academic
modality to eschew ideas that may sound too unruly for a printed page. 57
In this uncensored state, we hear what distinguishes the profession and
rule of law in our Supreme Court from those of so many other countries
and courtrooms-namely that lawyers expect that the Court will
acknowledge their facts, perceive their future, and adopt their
interpretative constitutional rule. '58 By contrast-and by design-decisions
153. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 29, 1964, at clip 163, Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (No. 615), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp31ist.htm
("[w]hen you make constitutional doctrine you try to look ahead a little bit and see where you are
going... that's the core of a very difficult problem; these cases are easy to decide if you just decide
them as a case and don't care where you are going, where you are looking, what the consequences
are").
154. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30, 1992, at clip 164, New
Yorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, 90-563), http://www.floridalaw
review.org/higginson/mp3 list.htm (sharply questioning whether state advocate would urge the same
position applied to other circumstances, reprimanding that "it's a principle we have to deal with,
not some individual scheme").
155. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 10, 1989, at clip 165, United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. "1 (1989) (No. 87-1295), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (attorney finishes his challenge to the constitutionality ofDEA drug profiling by asking
softly whether any empirical data exist to justify losing "[tihe very basis of being an
American.... the right to be left alone, to be free to go where we want to go without worrying
about intrusions .... I would only beg the Court to consider that we are giving up a very basic,
basic right for returns we have no knowledge").
156. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on July 8, 1974, at clip 166, United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766,73-1834), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (attacking special prosecutor as "a constitutional anomaly" inconsistent with
presidential control over the Executive).
157. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 5, 1988, at clip 167, Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-7028, 87-1904), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/
mp3list.htm (defending the constitutionality of restrictions on judicial powers to sentence, Solicitor
General Fried boldly observes that because "the doctrine of separation of powers is supposed to
have something to do with liberty ... it would be huge irony if this Court invalidated a statute
whose global effect is not to increase but sharply to curtail the prerogatives" of its own judicial
branch); Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 10, 2003, at clip 168, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267 (2004) (No. 02-1580), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (interrupting
claim for Court intervention into state redistricting plan, Chief Justice Rehnquist interjects, "the
Constitution doesn't ever use the word democracy").
158. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Apr. 17, 2002, at clip 169, Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730(2002) (No. 01-309), http://www.fioridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("What
should be the rule that you say was violated here. If we write out the opinion ... we say the
rule ... is and we have to fill in the blank, what is that rule?"); Recording of Oral Argument on Jan.
11, 2000, at clip 170, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("[T]his Court has had what I think is an
unfortunate 150 or 200 year history in trying to draw some kind of line as you are between local
and interstate effects. Most of those have failed. What's your line?"); Recording of Oral
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have finality. Sometimes, even, decisions let hard arguments go
unanswered, 59 trying to stay tidy, but playing high stakes that what has
been overlooked may be the better future-advocacy materials should be
re-examined for this reason also. 160
There is a better way to learn law and lawyering. The way is more
instructive and less expensive; more firsthand, less formal; more complete
with circumstance, less constricted as to possibility. Practically, it helps
one avoid being outwitted; or, if outwitted, to relax and manage the
crisis.161 As Emily Dickinson tells us, "To fill a Gap Insert the Thing that
Argument on Feb. 22, 1971, at clip 171, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 299),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (impassioned closing requests that the
Court "make clear" and "go further," beyond only a favorable outcome, to say that whole categories
of speech are protected by the First Amendment). Cf Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 30,
2004, at clip 172, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("Mr. Clement, you have a number of
strings to your bow. Is one of them more important than the others?").
159. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Jan. 13, 1997, at clip 173, Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (oral
argument poses difficult and explicit questions about whether trial judges could schedule court
appearances when the President has conflicting appearances, such as an overseas NATO
conference), with Clinton, 520 U.S. at 709 (distinguishing the immunity from suit conferred in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), yet in conclusion enjoining trial judges who schedule
litigation to adhere to the Fitzgerald "tradition... of giving the 'utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities').
160. Compare Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 5, 1988, at clip 174, Mistretta, 488 U.S.
361 (Nos. 87-7028, 87-1904), http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (Attorney
Alan Morrison acknowledging that various constitutional infirmities with the Sentencing Guidelines
were previously identified by lower courts but were not being presented to the Supreme Court),
with United Statesv. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,244 (2005) (invalidating aspects of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines on Sixth Amendment grounds, almost twenty years later). Indeed, hindsight inquiry will
reveal irony as often as missed opportunity. The Court's Tenth Amendment reversal of
direction announced in Garciav. SanAntonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,469 U.S. 528 (1985),
was relief that the United States rejected during oral argument, hear Recording of Oral
Reargument on Oct. 1, 1984, at clip 175, Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (Nos. 82-1913, 82-1951),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (in response to concerned questions from
Justice Blackmun about ongoing viability of the Court's existing "traditional governmental function
test," Solicitor General Rex Lee emphasizing "we think the entire approach is sound"). Yet, ten
years earlier, in argument preceding National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, the Justices pressed counsel with the political-process argument
that would become constitutional doctrine in Garcia. Hear Recording of Oral Reargument on Mar.
2, 1976, at clip 176, Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (Nos. 74-878,74-879), http://www.floridalawreview.org/
higginson/mp3list.htm.
161. Hear, e.g., Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 15, 1991, at clip 177, Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (No. 90-1059),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm (likening artists to felons who
embellish on their crimes, Justice Scalia relates "a hypothetical in law school" but, amidst laughter,
admits he forgets the answer); Recording of Oral Argument on May 14, 1990,
at clip 178, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (Nos. 89-1433, 89-1434),
http://www.floridalawreview.org/higginson/mp3list.htm ("Well, I say it's not this case anyway. I
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caused it.'' 162 There is a gap in how we understand the Constitution, and we
should insert the thing that caused it.
guess that's the best way to worm out of this. If I had to worm out, that's the way I'm going. It's
not this case. It's a hypothetical, and it's not this case.").
162. Emily Dickinson, Poem 546, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 266
(Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1997).
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